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Alex Rees-Jones, PhD

In one form or another, nearly all citizens in modern America face taxes.
Despite the significant social benefits of taxes, the individual costs of paying
them are famously aversive.
To combat their aversion to paying taxes, many taxpayers can exercise some control over their tax bill.
U.S. tax law includes a rich menu of tax-incentivized
behaviors, including favorable treatment of mortgage
interest, retirement savings, and charitable giving,
among many other provisions. Through undertaking
these actions, or through remembering to claim credits
or deductions due for actions already taken, substantial legal tax reductions are possible. More insidiously,
taxes may be illegally reduced through tax evasion.
Tax manipulation decisions like these meaningfully
affect federal revenue. Focusing on illegal evasion, the
difference between the tax revenue that is believed to
be due and the tax revenue that is actually collected
typically exceeds $400 billion per year. When it comes
to legal manipulation, recent work has documented
that taxpayers often forgo substantial tax savings to
avoid the hassle cost of itemizing their tax returns.1 In
total, enormous sums of money are legally and illegally
kept out of the tax collector’s hands every year, and
even greater sums could be if taxpayers chose to do so.
Improved understanding of the manipulationdecision-making process can provide tools to policymakers, as well as a means to better policy analysis.

SUMMARY
• Tax manipulation decisions—both legal uses of tax deductions
and illegal tax evasion—significantly affect federal revenue,
keeping enormous sums of money out of the tax collector’s
hands.
• In order to better understand the manipulation decision-making
process, this brief looks specifically at the impact of gain/loss
framing on tax manipulation, as part of a larger discussion
about the tools that policymakers have at their disposal for
both deterring tax evasion and making existing tax incentives
maximally effective.
• Analysis of tax data confirms that tax decisions are influenced
by “loss aversion.” Taxpayers are more likely to pursue tax
reduction activities when they make a loss smaller, as compared
to when they make a gain larger. Moreover, it may be possible
to reframe a taxpayer’s perception of what constitutes a gain
or a loss, potentially through relatively cheap alterations to
phrasing or presentation in tax documents.
• The brief discusses instances when such gain/loss framing
interventions might be deployed, and provides estimates around
the size of the revenue responses they may generate.
• The author estimates that if tax filers who face losses experienced the lower motivation to manipulate shown by those facing
gains, annual tax revenue would increase by $1.4 billion. Even
attempts at marginal interventions, though smaller in predicted
effects, might be financially worthwhile.
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style interventions, and the literature
building on this idea prominently contributed to Kahneman’s 2002 Nobel
Prize in Economics.
How might loss aversion influence
tax decisions? Imagine a taxpayer in
the process of filling out his annual tax
return shortly before tax day. In this
process, the taxpayer formally documents all of his tax-relevant information for the previous calendar year.
The resulting tax liability is compared
to the taxes already collected through
employer withholding and earlier
estimated tax payments. A remaining
difference nearly always exists, and
must be settled. This settlement can
be very naturally framed as a gain or
a loss. Most taxpayers receive money
back from the IRS in the form of a
refund—a literal gain. Remaining
taxpayers, however, must send a check
to the IRS to cover the tax that they
owe—a literal loss.
To see the potential impact of this
gain/loss framing, imagine that our
example taxpayer has a sense of the
balance that will be due. As he works
on his tax return, he considers a variety of options available to manipulate
the final balance that he will have to
report. He remembers that he made
a charitable contribution and knows
that if he spends time looking through
his records he can find that documentation and request a deduction. Addi-

A long history of research has focused
on rational incentives that affect these
decisions, such as the fear of financial penalties or social sanctions that
come with audits. In this Issue Brief,
I will discuss the highlights of my
recent research,2 which measures the
importance of a type of psychologically induced incentive on manipulation: specifically, the impact of gain/
loss framing. This will then shape the
discussion about the tools which policymakers may have at their disposal
both for deterring evasion and for
making existing tax incentives maximally effective.

GAIN/LOSS FRAMING
AND TAX MANIPULATION
DECISIONS
A large literature in psychology documents a robust asymmetry in both
judgments and decisions: our aversion
to losses typically outweighs our affection for equal-sized gains. Marginally
reducing the size of a loss is commensurately valued more highly than
marginally increasing the size of a
gain. These regularities are commonly
referred to as “loss aversion,” and serve
as a cornerstone of Daniel Kahneman
and Amos Tversky’s behavioral model
of Prospect Theory. Attempts to make
use of this aversion to losses have
become a go-to approach for “nudge”NOTES
See Benzarti (2015), “How Taxing is Tax Filing? Leaving
Money On The Table Because Of Compliance Costs,”
SSRN Working Paper 2412703.
2 See Rees-Jones, “Quantifying Loss-Averse Tax Manipulation,” Forthcoming at Review of Economic Studies.
3 See D. Jones (2012), “Inertia and Overwithholding: Explaining the Prevalence of Income Tax Refunds,” American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 4, 158–185.
1

See, e.g., Shepanski and Shearer (1995), “A Prospect
Theory Account of the Income Tax Withholding Phenomenon,” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision
Processes, 63, pp. 174–186.
5 See Rees-Jones and Taubinsky (2016), “Tax Psychology and the Timing of Charitable Giving Deadlines,” The
Urban Institute.
4
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tionally, he has a tax-preferred retirement savings plan and knows that if
he takes the time to add money to this
plan he might claim an adjustment to
income. This taxpayer also has income
from a small business and believes
that he might get away with illegally
evading taxes by claiming less business
income than he actually earned.
As I explore in my research, loss
aversion makes two distinct predictions about how this taxpayer would
think about this set of potential
manipulation decisions. First, loss
aversion would lead the taxpayer to
be more likely to pursue any of these
tax reduction activities in a situation
where it makes a loss smaller as compared to when it makes a gain larger.
Second, loss aversion predicts a sudden
drop in the incentives to manipulate as
soon as a loss is turned to a gain.
Directly examining these predictions is challenging, since the
taxpayers in question are actively
concealing their behavior. While
the pursuit of individual credits and
deductions is seen in tax records, tax
evasion is of course observed only in
cases where the evader is caught. As
a result, precise measurement of tax
manipulation is not possible in the
absence of extremely thorough audit
data, which are rarely available and
which would still leave some types of
evasion undetected.
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be associated with the pursuit of the
common tax manipulation opportunities that can be observed. Furthermore, it is more pronounced among
higher-income tax filers, who traditionally pursue the greatest amount
of tax manipulation. My estimates
suggest that individuals facing a loss
pursue an additional $34 of tax reductions above and beyond what would
be pursued if they faced a gain.

IMPLICATIONS FOR
OVERWITHHOLDING POLICY
Beyond providing a window into
the psychology surrounding manipulation decisions, these results inform
several practical questions of tax
policy design.

Perhaps most directly, the presence of this type of gain/loss framing
can affect the consequences of policies
that change the rate of overwithholding. Most taxpayers in America—77%
in the sample I studied—find that
they are overwithheld on tax day,
meaning that the taxes already withheld from their paycheck by their
employer were in excess of the total
taxes that were due. At the time of
filing, these taxpayers document their
overpayment and submit for a refund
in that amount.
Overwithholding has been argued
to have negative consequences for
taxpayers. A taxpayer who is owed a
refund on tax day effectively granted
the IRS a loan: they gave the IRS
money beyond what they owe in

FIGURE 1 DISTRIBUTION OF BALANCE DUE PREDICTED FROM LOSS-AVERSE
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Source: Quantifying Loss-Averse Tax Manipulation,” Rev Econ Stud, published online June 28, 2017,
doi:10.1093/restud/rdx038.

FIGURE 2 DISTRIBUTION OF BALANCE DUE FROM OBSERVED TAX RECORDS
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As I document in my work,
however, the presence of loss-averse
manipulation can be readily detected
without observing manipulation
itself. Rather, it can be inferred by
particular patterns in the shape of the
distribution of the balance due that is
reported to the IRS after all manipulation has occurred. As documented
in Figure 1, the first prediction noted
above (i.e., that taxpayers are more
likely to pursue tax reductions when
they make a loss smaller, as opposed
to when they make a gain bigger)
would lead to a “shift” of the loss
domain of the distribution: the higher
degree of manipulation would drive
this portion of the distribution to
lower values than would be forecasted
from behavior over gains. The second
prediction (i.e., that there is a sudden drop in the incentive to pursue
tax manipulation once a loss is turned
into a gain) would lead to “bunching”
near the reference point of zero: since
loss-averse taxpayers’ motivation to
manipulate drops as soon as they get
to zero, this would lead to an unduly
large number of tax returns being
filed with reported balances close to
zero. Importantly, the quantitative
impact of loss aversion on manipulation behavior may be inferred from
these features of the distribution with
relatively few assumptions.
As documented in Figure 2, these
predicted features are found in the
distribution of balance due observed
in tax records. As predicted by the
model, the distribution of balance
due is shifted in a manner consistent
with higher manipulation in the loss
domain, and significant excess mass
is seen in the near vicinity of zero
balance due. This pattern is shown to
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Source: Quantifying Loss-Averse Tax Manipulation,” Rev Econ Stud, published online June 28, 2017,
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taxes, and only receive that money
back after tax day. In contrast to a
typical loan, however, the IRS pays
no interest. As a result, if this money
were instead, for example, invested in
an interest-granting financial product
or used to pay off credit card bills,
it would have yielded the taxpayer
greater financial returns. Jones (2012)
estimated the average foregone interest due to overwithholding to be $63
in 2004.3 As discussed in that paper,
there are anecdotal reports of states
intentionally changing withholding
policy to try to capture some portion
of this interest.
If taxpayers are loss averse, the
burdens of overwithholding on taxpayers—and the benefits of overwithholding for government revenue
generation—are even more substantial
than these usual opportunity-cost
calculations would indicate. Overwithholding not only generates interest income for the government, but
it also leads to even greater revenue
generation because it reduces incentives for taxpayers to reduce their
taxes through manipulation activities.
Focusing on the interpretation of my
results for individuals, my estimates
suggests that the excess transfer to the
IRS associated with overwithholding
is 42% higher than one would infer
by considering interest costs alone.
And for government revenue, my
estimates suggests that at least 30% of
the extra revenue accrued to the government from overwithholding arises
from loss-averse behavioral responses
(i.e., reducing motivation for manipulation by presenting taxpayers with
apparent gains).
While it has been recognized for
some time that overwithholding is

more desirable for the tax authority if
tax filers are loss-averse,4 my approach
provides the first estimates of the
magnitude of these effects. In short,
loss aversion accounts for a significant
portion of the costs or benefits of
policy changes in this domain.

Conceptually, it may be possible to
reframe a taxpayer’s perception of what
constitutes a gain or a loss—potentially through relatively cheap alterations to phrasing or presentation in tax
documents. In this section, I discuss
the manner in which such framing
interventions might be deployed, and
provide estimates guiding the size of
the revenue responses that may be
possible with such interventions.

try. Conceptually, such an approach is
similar to local energy providers who
supply regular reports to homeowners
about energy use and efficiency relative to their neighbors, with the goal
of decreasing energy use or increasing investments in energy efficient
appliances. If the government could
present the small business owner’s tax
payments on a scale that reframes her
perceived tax losses as relative gains,
compared to other people or even
to herself over time, the payment of
taxes may be less likely to trigger the
psychology of loss aversion, and thus
less likely to be associated with an
increase in attempts at evasion. Given
the low-cost of information interventions such as these, such an approach
has the potential to be cost-effective
when compared to existing tools for
dissuading tax evasion, such as audits.

1. GAIN FRAMING TO MINIMIZE
EVASION

2. LOSS FRAMING TO MAXIMIZE
UPTAKE OF TAX INCENTIVES

Gain framing may prove useful as a
tool to dissuade evasion among traditionally noncompliant groups.
To illustrate the nature of a gain
framing intervention, consider a small
business owner. Compared to wage
and salary income, income from small
businesses is more likely to be associated with evasion, due to the greater
difficulty associated with detecting a misrepresentation of earnings.
Because this tax filer is in an at-risk
group for tax evasion, the tax authority could attempt to ensure that this
taxpayer’s bill is viewed as a gain. One
potential means of doing so would
be to provide a report that shows the
taxes she paid in relation to a group
of comparable business owners in her
geographic area or within her indus-

Many of the credits and deductions
that constitute legal tax manipulation
opportunities are rewards for activities we view as socially desirable. For
example, they might provide financial
benefit to those who donate to charity,
make energy saving improvements
to their home, or spend on childcare.
In situations where loss framing can
be induced, it potentially could be
applied to intentionally increase taxpayers’ uptake of these behaviors.
Concretely, loss framing interventions would involve making the
targeted citizens’ tax bill salient, presented in a way where the tax transfer
is framed as a loss, and then making
it clear that this loss can be reduced
by pursuing a tax-incentivized activity. For example, charitable institutions

THE POTENTIAL OF FRAMING
EFFECTS
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could target potential donors in the
time around tax day, reminding them
of the tax payments that they are in
the process of documenting and presenting the potentially desirable option
of reducing some of those payments
by making an immediate donation to
charity. While such loss framing would
translate into less money collected
in the form of taxes, it does so in the
name of directing resources toward
other socially-beneficial ends.
One complication that arises
with this approach is that, for many
tax-incentivized activities, the time at
which the tax benefits are documented
and realized will not occur until the
next calendar year. For example, if a
tax filer is completing their 2017 tax
return in April of 2018, an immediate
donation to charity will only affect the
next tax return that will be submitted
in April of 2019. Issues such as these
have motivated attempts to change the
deadlines for the claiming of tax benefits for charitable giving from the end
of the calendar year to tax day of the
following year, in order to capitalize on
taxpayers’ immediate desire to mitigate
tax losses when they become salient
during tax season.5 Such changes in
deadlines likely would prove effective
in the presence of loss aversion.
3. APPROXIMATING THE POTENTIAL
REVENUE IMPACT OF FRAMING
POLICIES

Attempts to influence the gain or loss
framing adopted by taxpayers may

provide a quantitatively important
policy tool to the tax authority. To
illustrate the potential aggregate consequences, I calculate the predicted
consequence of large-scale framing
changes under the assumption that
the impact of loss framing on manipulation remains similar to what I
have measured.
To help illustrate the potential
magnitude of framing interventions,
we may compare the predicted differences in tax manipulation that would
arise if we transitioned from the status
quo—in which approximately three
quarters of taxpayers face a gain on tax
day—to a world where all taxpayers
viewed their final tax bill as a gain, or
to one where all taxpayers viewed their
tax bill as a loss. My estimates suggest
that, if all tax filers who currently face
gains were as motivated to manipulate
as those facing losses, annual tax revenue would decrease by $3.7 billion. If
tax filers who face losses experienced
the lower motivation to manipulate of
those facing gains, annual tax revenue
would increase by $1.4 billion.
Of course, extrapolating to such
different policy regimes inherently
involves strong assumptions; and
indeed, it is unlikely that interventions exist that could control all
taxpayers’ perceptions of whether
their tax bill constitutes a gain or
loss. However, predicted effect sizes
of this magnitude suggest that even
attempts at marginal interventions
might be worthwhile. For example, an

5

intervention that leads a mere 1% of
taxpayers to change their assessment
of their tax bill from a loss to a gain is
predicted to increase revenue by $51
million. While effects of this size are
small when compared to the national
budget, capitalizing on this psychology can provide a cost-effective means
of making the most of the tax system
in place.

CONCLUSION
A greater understanding of the psychology of the loss-averse taxpayer
creates new opportunities for policymakers. Incorporating this psychology into analysis of existing policy
can assist in accurately predicting
taxpayer behavior, and in accurately
predicting the situations in which the
tax authority should expect evasion.
Perhaps more interestingly, this psychology provides an opportunity for
tax authorities to control the incentives for tax manipulation activities by
controlling the framing of tax gains
and losses. Through these channels,
tax manipulation decisions provide a
setting in which the simple psychology of gain/loss framing can generate
large revenue effects in the aggregate.
As governments continue to integrate
ideas from behavioral science into the
design of policy, attempts to specifically deploy these ideas to control tax
morale likely will prove to be useful.
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